I am journaling (?) a little late on this reading because of a trip to Indiana and Kentucky. We saw lots of corn, lost two games, got hopelessly misguided by a GPS, but played better than we ever have before. So, all in all, a success. Back to the real world.
"'Militarism' is, in fact, a relative newcomer to the vocabulary of politics, and it was coined by those who opposed it - a derogatory epithet hurled against Bismarck and Napoleon III in the 1860s" (87).
Joll and Martel follow the military and armaments of the major powers in the following order: Germany, Britain, France, Russia, Austro-Hungary, Italy, Serbia. A short description of strategy follows.
Germany was the country where military values influenced soviety more strongly than anywhere else. The German military was also unique in the fact that it was free from civilian political control. Military planning, mobilization, deployment, and operations were concentrated in a single agency free from political and administrative interference. And the only coordinating power lay with the Kaiser himself.
"Strategic planning for a war against Russia should have been accompanied by a foreign policy aimed at securing at least the neutrality of Britain. Strategic plannind for a war against Britain should have involved a foreign policy aimed at securing the friendship of Russia" (93).
The Anglo-German naval rivalry was a mjor factor leading Britain to back French policy in Morocco and aligned Britain on Russia's side. It's interesting that the naval building that both Germany and Britain had undertaken turned out to be inappropriate to the war at see as it developed (it was a way of subs and destroyers). The German naval program lead to a radical change in British strategic thinking. The German fleet was the first real threat to Britain's superiority since the Napoleonic Wars.
"This continual arming, compelling the other to keep up with Germany, is itself kind of warfare. I do not know whether the expression has bee used previously, but one could say it is a cold war. There is no shooting but there is bleeding" (101) German socialist thinker Eduard Bernstein
French military planning was dominated by the effects of the defeat of 1871. After 1904, French military planning concentrated on Germany. After having previously shortened the length of miltary service, in 1913, the government extended the period of military service from two to three years. French hope of a victory over Germany became depedent on an alliance with Russia.
The Russians themselves were relunctant to undertake an offensive against Germany because they had to undertake a war on two fronts, against both Germany and Austria-Hungary.
In Austro-Hungary, the army was one of the unifying forces in a multinational state. On the other hand, the army suffered from the defect of the Monarchy as a whole, the complicated administrative system. There was friction between the Austrian and Hungarian government about the number of conscipts to be raised from each half of the monarchy each year. Austria-Hungary also had a long frontier.
Despite the nationalism that had surrounding Italy's army 30 years earlier, the army was being viewd by the anti-militarist Left as the force that was used to break strike or suppress popular disturbances. Italy was in an arms race with Austria-Hungary. "The weakness of the Italiam armed forces were not the result of a lack of imagination or technical skill but rather of the bureaucratic organizatino of the army and navy and of their system of supply" (111).
In Serbia in 1903, a group within the army murdered the king and replaced him with a monarch from a rival synasty. The king owed his position to the army. On page 113, there is a brief, well written summary of the National Defence and the Black Hand. In Serbia, the army was regarded as a symbol of national aspirations.
The arms race itself contributed to the feeling that war was inevitable. "German naval expansion provoked British naval expansion: the Navy League in Germany was paralleled by the Navy League in Britain and complemented by the Austrian Naval League. Russian military expenditure provided the excuse for German army increases and these in turn provoked the French three-year law" (115).
"The consequences of this miscalculation (hope for a short war) were to make the First World War a far more significant turning point in European history than those who embarked on it..." (132).
Conclusion