I enjoyed the incredible organization and structure of this reading, as opposed to the Galloping Gertie reading on Tuesday. The first five and a half pages were a beautifully organized introduction. Stephenson argues that "from 1905 onward military measures became mroe extensive and more directed toward compellence. To this extent European diplomacy became more militarized, and this development enourages risks, fueled competition in armaments, and familiarized public opinion with the possibility of war" (129). I think that Stephenson's last point (that by diplomacy becoming more militarized it familiarised public opinion with war) is very interesting and is something that we have not discussed in the course yet.
Stephenson follows the "crisis slide" by exploring the military consequence of the diplomatic conflicts that lead to war: the first Moroccan crisis, Bosnia, the second Moroccan crisis at Agadir, the First Balkan War, and finally the crisis of July 1914. He concludes by saying that the successino fo militarized confrontatinos between 1905 and 1912 encouraged a growing recklessness among European leaders.
"Great commotions arise out of small things, but not necessarily concerning small things" (160). Winston Churchill
"Great wars resemble volcanic erruoptions rather than earthquakes: warning signs procede them" (160).