Chapter 4: The Bosnian-Herzegovina Annexation Crisis and the Recovery of Russian Power, 1908-1911
In Guchkov's 1908 speech in the Duma, he attacked the failure of all attempts at rebuilding the army since the war with Japan. He laid open the weakness of Russia's military for all to see. This sign of weakness was a vital condition for Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia and Gerzegovina from the Ottomans three months later. They knew that Russia could not do anything is Vienna made such a move. Guchkov's speech forced the Duma to initiate in military reforms from 1909 onward.
The Balance of Miltary Power and the Outbreak of the Annexation Crisis
Austria-Hungary declared in annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 5, 1908, without giving anyone else any warning. Their timing depended upon the balance of military power. The condition of the Russian army left Russia incapable of protecting their slavic brothers.
The Powerlessness of Russia in the Crisis
A German reported that Rediger regaurded war as "the greatest misfortune that could befall the Russia army. He knows that it is not ready for war, adn he fears for his whole beloved work, the internal reform of the army..." (118).
"Nobody in the German leadership believed that Russia would fight. When reports crossed Kaiser Wilhelm's desk saying that Izvolsky was warning that pro-Slav public opinion might push him into action over Bosnia and Gerzegovina, the emperor was fond of writing 'Bluff' in the margins" (119).
The Prospect of Preventative War and the End of the Crisis
Although the Germans and Austro-Hungarians were confident of Russia's military weakness they chose not to attack Russia.
Reactions to the Annexation Crisis
France and Britian justifiably regarded the conduct of Germany and Austria-Hungary was an ill omen for future relations. During the crisis, the Russians decided that they would fight back next time. The duma made many appropriations for the army.
Aviation: The Aeroplane Supersedes the Dirigible
France got the head start on aeroplanes. The French success was seem as a triuph for French national pride. "Germany has shamfully little to show int he face of the French achievements" (140). The aeroplane eventually becames obviously more effective than the Dirigible.
Chapter 5: The Second Moroccan Crisis and the Beginning of German Panic, 1911-1912
In November of 1911, the German government knowingly started a program of military development that they knew would start an arms race. The Germans now saw a European War as inevitable. Russia's military recover was complete enough to be seen as a reliable ally. While the balance of military power played litle part in the origins of the crisis, the balance of military played a large role in the course and outsome of the crisis.
The Balance of Military Power in the Crisis
War wasn't ideal for anyone in 1911. The new French war minister, Messimy, wanted to make massive improvements to his inferior forces.
Both the Russians and British sent vague signals about their willingness to join in a war over Morocco. The main fear was of being dragged into a war over French colonial claims in which there was no national interest (the Russian military was also not prepared).
Russia was essentially the tipping point. The French could nt be certian that Russia would intervene, while the Germans could not be certain that Russia would stay out.
The German Reaction to the Crisis: The 1912 Army Law
The balance of military power dominated the aftermath of the Second Moroccan crisis. The new military law of 1912 was a massive program of army expansion in Germany. The domestic view of the German army was very poor before the implementaiton of the 1912 army law.
The most significant military consequence of the second Morocan crsis was the German decision to embark on an extraordinary program of land armament in the expectation of future war.