Thursday, November 18, 2010
Paper
I'm keeping my research journal for my paper separate. If you would like to see it, throw an e-mail my way and I'll pass it along.
Steiner/Nelison: Conclusion
This is our last reading? Wow.
Semesters fly by.
The conclusion itself was well done. It was almost like a list at times, checking off the items on their "arguments to be made."
Britain entered the war for defensive purposes ("because she feared a Germany victory in Western Europe would threaten her safety and her empire"). Germany wanted to become a world power. Grey's continued use of the "free hand" policies of the Conservatives to constrain Germany, but keep France and Russia in check.
The war seemed inevitable.
Britain had reached the height of her power, but she still had tons of money in the bank. She was, however, going no where but down, speaking in terms of finance and power.
The options available to Grey were limited. Germany was a threat. Something had to be done. Interesting Question: What other things could Grey have done? What alternate policies could he had implemented?
I think he did the best job that he could have done and that his time was much better spent being foreign secretary than "fishing or birdwatching."
Semesters fly by.
The conclusion itself was well done. It was almost like a list at times, checking off the items on their "arguments to be made."
Britain entered the war for defensive purposes ("because she feared a Germany victory in Western Europe would threaten her safety and her empire"). Germany wanted to become a world power. Grey's continued use of the "free hand" policies of the Conservatives to constrain Germany, but keep France and Russia in check.
The war seemed inevitable.
Britain had reached the height of her power, but she still had tons of money in the bank. She was, however, going no where but down, speaking in terms of finance and power.
The options available to Grey were limited. Germany was a threat. Something had to be done. Interesting Question: What other things could Grey have done? What alternate policies could he had implemented?
I think he did the best job that he could have done and that his time was much better spent being foreign secretary than "fishing or birdwatching."
Monday, November 15, 2010
Steiner/Neilson 182-258: Chapters 8-9
Chapter 8: The Professional Influence: Diplomats and Officers
The foreign office recruited a narrow social and educational elite. They shared an excessive pride in being English and a contempt for foreigners (doesn't really go along with the diplomatic profession).
Grey and his senior advisers shared a common set of values which smoothed the bureaucratic process. There was a shift in Foreign Office thinking around the turn of the century which was associated with the imperial conflicts of the 1890s. They began think in more continental terms with the German danger being more immediate than the American or the Japanese. The officials maintained the belief that the country should be free to move as her interests changed. The need to nourish and strengthen the links with France and Russia was a constant preoccupation.
Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary, 1905-10
The most striking change in Britain's strategy was the army's conversion to a continental commitment. Suprising lack of communication between the War Office and Admiralty. Despite the dedication to a continental war, the army had neither the men nor the material to sustain a major European War. Contradition between Britain's new land strategy and her resources.
The Empire assisted Britain in the war.
Chapter 9: The July Crisis
In the summer, the domestic issues were a very big deal. This left little time for conversation among foreign affairs in the cabinent. The armament figures were frightening.
After Franz Ferdinand's assination, Grey tried his hardest to come to a diplomatic solution. Eventually, it appeared to the Foreign Office that war was inevitable. Grey tried to get the French and the Russians to do everything they could to deter the war. The Prime Minister remained certain that Britain could remain a spectator. Three people died in Ireland and still, the focus of the cabinent was on Europe.
Despite knowning that he would back France, Grey continued to state his neutrality to Germany. Germans often blame the war on him, for this reason. Grey blamed the German militantists.
The foreign office recruited a narrow social and educational elite. They shared an excessive pride in being English and a contempt for foreigners (doesn't really go along with the diplomatic profession).
Grey and his senior advisers shared a common set of values which smoothed the bureaucratic process. There was a shift in Foreign Office thinking around the turn of the century which was associated with the imperial conflicts of the 1890s. They began think in more continental terms with the German danger being more immediate than the American or the Japanese. The officials maintained the belief that the country should be free to move as her interests changed. The need to nourish and strengthen the links with France and Russia was a constant preoccupation.
Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary, 1905-10
- seen as an invaluable advisor/loyal servant
- had royal connections
- convinced of Germany's power and hostile intentions
- loyal to French Entente, but more concerned with Russia
- relationship with Grey: more of equals
- poor administrator
- never established a close relationship with Grey (political differences)
- antipathy towards liberal party
- denounced the government's domestic policies
- adamantly opposed to German detente
- worried excessively about Russians
- Russian entente > French entente
- leading German expert
- opposed almost every effort to come to terms with Berlin
- support France
- Grey questioned his conclusions
- close to Crowe with strong German connections
- relieved Grey of many functions of private life
- stressed German menace
- strengthen Entente with France
The most striking change in Britain's strategy was the army's conversion to a continental commitment. Suprising lack of communication between the War Office and Admiralty. Despite the dedication to a continental war, the army had neither the men nor the material to sustain a major European War. Contradition between Britain's new land strategy and her resources.
The Empire assisted Britain in the war.
Chapter 9: The July Crisis
In the summer, the domestic issues were a very big deal. This left little time for conversation among foreign affairs in the cabinent. The armament figures were frightening.
After Franz Ferdinand's assination, Grey tried his hardest to come to a diplomatic solution. Eventually, it appeared to the Foreign Office that war was inevitable. Grey tried to get the French and the Russians to do everything they could to deter the war. The Prime Minister remained certain that Britain could remain a spectator. Three people died in Ireland and still, the focus of the cabinent was on Europe.
Despite knowning that he would back France, Grey continued to state his neutrality to Germany. Germans often blame the war on him, for this reason. Grey blamed the German militantists.
Thursday, November 11, 2010
Steiner/Neilson 117-182: Chapters 6, 7
Chapter 6: The Balkans, Russia and Germany, 1912-1914
The collapse of the Turkish empire gave a new importance to the old Austro-Russian rivalry. Russia's need of the straits represented the weakest link in the Entente chain.
During the Balkan War, Britain worked closely with the Germans to prevent any European power from taking advantage of the Balkan debacle to the detriment of the peace of Europe. He welcomed German cooperation as the best means of preserving the peace. Grey also acted as a "useful and patient mediator between Russia and Austria." The French conceded this iniatiave to Grey.
Grey's involvement preserved the European peace, but created diplomatic trouble. The Russians were convinced (because of the British block) that the British were at most doubtful friends. The Germans were using the Balkan War to court London while flirting with Russia.
Russia's power was growing.
They began sneaking into the neutral zone in Central Asia. The Russians blocked Grey's suggested railroad route.
Nicolson, Summer 1914: "our relations with Russia are now approaching a point where we shall have to make up our minds as to whether we should become really intimate and permanent friends or else diverge into another path."
Russia could not act without the support of her partners and French action was reliant on British cooperation.
Even though Grey spoke to Germany about his potential neutrality, it was clear that he had already chosen the side of Britain.
Chapter 7: The Domestic Contest: Liberal Politics and Conservative Pressure
Grey enjoyed more freedom than his German counterpart. Only the PM had a real check on the Foreign minister's actions. The Foreign office did not have to reveal anything that they did not want to.
The makers of foreign policy stood above the media.
The collapse of the Turkish empire gave a new importance to the old Austro-Russian rivalry. Russia's need of the straits represented the weakest link in the Entente chain.
During the Balkan War, Britain worked closely with the Germans to prevent any European power from taking advantage of the Balkan debacle to the detriment of the peace of Europe. He welcomed German cooperation as the best means of preserving the peace. Grey also acted as a "useful and patient mediator between Russia and Austria." The French conceded this iniatiave to Grey.
Grey's involvement preserved the European peace, but created diplomatic trouble. The Russians were convinced (because of the British block) that the British were at most doubtful friends. The Germans were using the Balkan War to court London while flirting with Russia.
Russia's power was growing.
They began sneaking into the neutral zone in Central Asia. The Russians blocked Grey's suggested railroad route.
Nicolson, Summer 1914: "our relations with Russia are now approaching a point where we shall have to make up our minds as to whether we should become really intimate and permanent friends or else diverge into another path."
Russia could not act without the support of her partners and French action was reliant on British cooperation.
Even though Grey spoke to Germany about his potential neutrality, it was clear that he had already chosen the side of Britain.
Chapter 7: The Domestic Contest: Liberal Politics and Conservative Pressure
Grey enjoyed more freedom than his German counterpart. Only the PM had a real check on the Foreign minister's actions. The Foreign office did not have to reveal anything that they did not want to.
The makers of foreign policy stood above the media.
Tuesday, November 9, 2010
Steiner/Neilson 44-116: Chapters 3, 4, 5
Chapter One: Britain and Germany: The Myth of Rivalry
German diplomatic methods reinforced the British sense of being blackmailed. Grey was more interesting in maintaining the prestige of the Entent than with promotnig a peaceful relation with Berlin.
Crowe's Memorandum of 1/1/07: examined list of Anglo-German disputes and argued that German policy was dominated by hostility towards Britain and a "disregard to for the elementary rules of straightforward and honourable dealing." The only answer to the German challenge was a reassertion of Britain's traditional balance of power policy. (which we read about in the reading about Austria-Hungary) The memorandum was clear and logical and had a deep understanding of past history and present danger.
Grey firmly believed in the German threat. He was afraid of continental isolation. This gave the French a powerful diplomatic weapon.
The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry
Early in the rivalry the Germans refused to discuss the naval question, even at conferences proclaimed for that very purpose. During the years between 1908 and 1912, the naval rivalry dominated all relations between Britain and Germany.
The British responded to the amended Naval law (Nov 1907) with the Fisher reforms, which forced the Germans to prepare for a British preventative strike.
The new Chancellor in Germany was "anxious to make a new approach to the British to settle outstanding differences and to negotiate both a naval arrangement and a neutrality pact between the two countries." This increased the British belief that the German naval plans were a form of elaborate blackmail.
In 1909 Bethmann-Hollweg proposed that the two nations commence negotiatinos for a political and naval agreement. The next two years were full of fruitless effort which failed to produce an agreement and also created more tension between the two nations.
Most agreed that the aim of Germany in the negotiations was to destroy the Triple Entente and isolate France as much as possible.
The Question of Economic Competition
The fleet rivalry was the strongest issue that divided the two countries. Germany had a second round industrial revolution, which England had a first, so the German products were cheaper and more efficiently made. Britain had the lead in international investment. The Foreign Office left merchants alone to conduct their own business and often blurred the line between trade and politics.
The German demand for a "place in the sun" always seemed artificial. "Some aspects of the Anglo-German rivalry were exaggerated by those who believed in its existance."
Chapter 4: Britain and Russia: The Troubled Relationship
Britain and Russia were the most important players in European politics during the 19th century. Because of the large ideological gulf between the two nations there was rampant Russophobia in Britain. There were efforts to expel the Russophobia by academics, but the political struggle remained between the two nations.
1902: Anglo-Japanese Alliance
1905: Russo-Japanese War
After Russo-Japanese War Izvolskii was willing to create some sort of treaty with Britain. The focus of the Anglo-Russia relations were Persia and the Balkans. Grey wanted to see a strong Russia, but not a Russia willing to threaten Britain's position overseas. Much of the deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations was due to the improvement in Russia's military situation.
From 1904-1914, the relations of the two nations improved from veiled hostility to wary friendship.
Chapter 5: Britain, Germany, and France, 1912-1914: Flexibility and Constraint
After the Agadir Crisis many members of the British parliament wanted to have another go at Anglo-German repproachment. In 1909, Haldane visited Germany and was presented with a draft by the Chancellor. It was denied. A British responsive draft was denited on March 19. It was not the foreign office which blocked the agreement, but the fundamental incompatibility between the British and German governments.
The two nations remained hostile with conflicting goals in mind. Churchill suggested a naval holiday in 1913. The British had won the naval race.
France and The Anglo-French Naval Exchanges, 1912
Grey had to prove to France that British discussions with Germany were not going to destroy the Anglo-French Entente.
The French let the British use some of their boats. This made Britain have to create a positive statement about what the British would do in the defence of France if a war were to break out.
Detente with Germany: The Anglo-German Portuguese Treaties
In 1913, Britain gave Germany some colonial land in Portugal, but the colonial issue "could no lnoger reshape European relationships."
The Baghdad Railway Negotiations 1912-1914
The same conclusion was met as was in Portugal. The Treaty of 1914 settled one fo the few concrete issues which divided London and Berlin, but this was not enough to solve their ideological differences.
German diplomatic methods reinforced the British sense of being blackmailed. Grey was more interesting in maintaining the prestige of the Entent than with promotnig a peaceful relation with Berlin.
Crowe's Memorandum of 1/1/07: examined list of Anglo-German disputes and argued that German policy was dominated by hostility towards Britain and a "disregard to for the elementary rules of straightforward and honourable dealing." The only answer to the German challenge was a reassertion of Britain's traditional balance of power policy. (which we read about in the reading about Austria-Hungary) The memorandum was clear and logical and had a deep understanding of past history and present danger.
Grey firmly believed in the German threat. He was afraid of continental isolation. This gave the French a powerful diplomatic weapon.
The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry
Early in the rivalry the Germans refused to discuss the naval question, even at conferences proclaimed for that very purpose. During the years between 1908 and 1912, the naval rivalry dominated all relations between Britain and Germany.
The British responded to the amended Naval law (Nov 1907) with the Fisher reforms, which forced the Germans to prepare for a British preventative strike.
The new Chancellor in Germany was "anxious to make a new approach to the British to settle outstanding differences and to negotiate both a naval arrangement and a neutrality pact between the two countries." This increased the British belief that the German naval plans were a form of elaborate blackmail.
In 1909 Bethmann-Hollweg proposed that the two nations commence negotiatinos for a political and naval agreement. The next two years were full of fruitless effort which failed to produce an agreement and also created more tension between the two nations.
Most agreed that the aim of Germany in the negotiations was to destroy the Triple Entente and isolate France as much as possible.
The Question of Economic Competition
The fleet rivalry was the strongest issue that divided the two countries. Germany had a second round industrial revolution, which England had a first, so the German products were cheaper and more efficiently made. Britain had the lead in international investment. The Foreign Office left merchants alone to conduct their own business and often blurred the line between trade and politics.
The German demand for a "place in the sun" always seemed artificial. "Some aspects of the Anglo-German rivalry were exaggerated by those who believed in its existance."
Chapter 4: Britain and Russia: The Troubled Relationship
Britain and Russia were the most important players in European politics during the 19th century. Because of the large ideological gulf between the two nations there was rampant Russophobia in Britain. There were efforts to expel the Russophobia by academics, but the political struggle remained between the two nations.
1902: Anglo-Japanese Alliance
1905: Russo-Japanese War
After Russo-Japanese War Izvolskii was willing to create some sort of treaty with Britain. The focus of the Anglo-Russia relations were Persia and the Balkans. Grey wanted to see a strong Russia, but not a Russia willing to threaten Britain's position overseas. Much of the deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations was due to the improvement in Russia's military situation.
From 1904-1914, the relations of the two nations improved from veiled hostility to wary friendship.
Chapter 5: Britain, Germany, and France, 1912-1914: Flexibility and Constraint
After the Agadir Crisis many members of the British parliament wanted to have another go at Anglo-German repproachment. In 1909, Haldane visited Germany and was presented with a draft by the Chancellor. It was denied. A British responsive draft was denited on March 19. It was not the foreign office which blocked the agreement, but the fundamental incompatibility between the British and German governments.
The two nations remained hostile with conflicting goals in mind. Churchill suggested a naval holiday in 1913. The British had won the naval race.
France and The Anglo-French Naval Exchanges, 1912
Grey had to prove to France that British discussions with Germany were not going to destroy the Anglo-French Entente.
The French let the British use some of their boats. This made Britain have to create a positive statement about what the British would do in the defence of France if a war were to break out.
Detente with Germany: The Anglo-German Portuguese Treaties
In 1913, Britain gave Germany some colonial land in Portugal, but the colonial issue "could no lnoger reshape European relationships."
The Baghdad Railway Negotiations 1912-1914
The same conclusion was met as was in Portugal. The Treaty of 1914 settled one fo the few concrete issues which divided London and Berlin, but this was not enough to solve their ideological differences.
Thursday, November 4, 2010
Steiner/Neilson 1-43: Chapters 1 and 2
Chapter 1: The Conservative Watershed
Queen Victoria's death in the beginning of 1901 ended one age and ushered in a new one.
The Political Pattern
It was a time of flux for both major political sides. The Conservative Part was gaining many of the new suburbian, Whig, and wealthy voters that used to side with the Liberals. The Liberal party was loosing numbers, but still withstood the Conservative challenge. The power of both groups was being challenged after 1900, with the introduction of a new kind of candidate: men from professional classes who had made names as intellectualy. The power of this new group increased as the old basis of support of the Liberal party shrunk.
Another growing group was the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). In the 1906 election, five LRC members wom their elections. The LRC worked closely with the radical wing of the Liberal party.
In 1906, the Liberal party won the election under the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman.
The Economic Background
The urbanization of population created a increased in demand for imported grain and cereal products. Exports (which had declined in the past two decades) also increased. However, the increase in exports did not compare with the increased value and volume of imports.
The US and Germany were industrials machines compared to Britain in this period. Along with the fall in productivity figures and in the output per man hours, the British government feared falling far behind their powerful counterparts.
Question: What is an 'invisible export?' (I was sitting next to an Econ major when I was reading this. I asked him and he made some sly Harry Potter comment.)
Forms of Imperialism
Factors that backed Imperialism: spread of Liberalism and Christianity, betterment of mankind, Social Dawminism. The economic motive was the most official in popular thoughts.
"The flag had followed the Bible and trade had followed the flag."
The debate over Imperialism created a more nationalistic and imperial-minded public.
The Boer War as Catalyst
In fact, trade did not follow the flag. The greatest exchange of goods occurred not between Britain and her colonies but between Britain and her European rivals.
Most people agreed on the war's necessity, but the longer the war drug on the more people began speaking out against it. Many Conservatives and Liberal Imperialists began arguing for a "more unified and efficient" empire, instead of expansion.
Chapter 2: The Diplomatic Response
The diplomatic realignment was a response to Britain's shifting imperial position.
The Turn Towards Germany
As Britain's interest shifted away from Turkey their interest in working with the Triple Alliance deteriorated.
Chamberlain's bid for alliance speech in 1899 proved only that the German government was cool and the British public hostile. A German alliance was never really practical because the interests of the two nations did not mesh.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
Lansdowne was still left with the problem of the Russian march into China, so an Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed on January 30, 1902. The tready marked a sharp departure from Britain's "no alliance" policy.
The Anglo-French Entente
The Anglo-French Entente was a colonial arrangement created to settle the French position in Morocco. It was signed two months after the start of the Russo-Japanese War and was renewed in 1905.
Relations with Germany
The Entente was not directed against Germany. The growing German fleet was a worry for the British military leaders and a direct thread to British security. Admiral Fisher (haha) was promoted to First Sea Lord in 1904. He created a number of reforms including the establishment of a new base in the North Sea, directed towards Germany.
Lansdowne did not understand the consequences of his own policies. By signing and Entente with France, he plunged Britain directly into continental affairs.
The First Moroccan Crisis, 1905
The German was seen by Lansdowne as an attempt to shatter the Entente. It actually made it stronger. The events of 1905 hastened a transformation in military strategy. The foreign secretary was forced to consider what would happen if a deterioration in relations with Germany occured.
The Advent of Sir Edward Grey
Grey took office in a moment of crisis. He was a conservative by tradition and inclinatino, yet he remained suprisingly radical in some of his domestic sympathies. "E.G. is like steel. His display of character is immense...it shines out." Grey was a big navy many and favored the Fisher reforms.
"It was essential that the Liberals...be represented by a man whose patriotism was not in doubt and who wuold gain support from both sides of the House." Does anyone exist like that anymore?
He was thought of as a statesmen rather than a politician. Against an alliance with Germany from the beginning, Grey favored alliances with the US, Russia, and France.
Queen Victoria's death in the beginning of 1901 ended one age and ushered in a new one.
The Political Pattern
It was a time of flux for both major political sides. The Conservative Part was gaining many of the new suburbian, Whig, and wealthy voters that used to side with the Liberals. The Liberal party was loosing numbers, but still withstood the Conservative challenge. The power of both groups was being challenged after 1900, with the introduction of a new kind of candidate: men from professional classes who had made names as intellectualy. The power of this new group increased as the old basis of support of the Liberal party shrunk.
Another growing group was the Labour Representation Committee (LRC). In the 1906 election, five LRC members wom their elections. The LRC worked closely with the radical wing of the Liberal party.
In 1906, the Liberal party won the election under the leadership of Campbell-Bannerman.
The Economic Background
The urbanization of population created a increased in demand for imported grain and cereal products. Exports (which had declined in the past two decades) also increased. However, the increase in exports did not compare with the increased value and volume of imports.
The US and Germany were industrials machines compared to Britain in this period. Along with the fall in productivity figures and in the output per man hours, the British government feared falling far behind their powerful counterparts.
Question: What is an 'invisible export?' (I was sitting next to an Econ major when I was reading this. I asked him and he made some sly Harry Potter comment.)
Forms of Imperialism
Factors that backed Imperialism: spread of Liberalism and Christianity, betterment of mankind, Social Dawminism. The economic motive was the most official in popular thoughts.
"The flag had followed the Bible and trade had followed the flag."
The debate over Imperialism created a more nationalistic and imperial-minded public.
The Boer War as Catalyst
In fact, trade did not follow the flag. The greatest exchange of goods occurred not between Britain and her colonies but between Britain and her European rivals.
Most people agreed on the war's necessity, but the longer the war drug on the more people began speaking out against it. Many Conservatives and Liberal Imperialists began arguing for a "more unified and efficient" empire, instead of expansion.
Chapter 2: The Diplomatic Response
The diplomatic realignment was a response to Britain's shifting imperial position.
The Turn Towards Germany
As Britain's interest shifted away from Turkey their interest in working with the Triple Alliance deteriorated.
Chamberlain's bid for alliance speech in 1899 proved only that the German government was cool and the British public hostile. A German alliance was never really practical because the interests of the two nations did not mesh.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
Lansdowne was still left with the problem of the Russian march into China, so an Anglo-Japanese treaty was signed on January 30, 1902. The tready marked a sharp departure from Britain's "no alliance" policy.
The Anglo-French Entente
The Anglo-French Entente was a colonial arrangement created to settle the French position in Morocco. It was signed two months after the start of the Russo-Japanese War and was renewed in 1905.
Relations with Germany
The Entente was not directed against Germany. The growing German fleet was a worry for the British military leaders and a direct thread to British security. Admiral Fisher (haha) was promoted to First Sea Lord in 1904. He created a number of reforms including the establishment of a new base in the North Sea, directed towards Germany.
Lansdowne did not understand the consequences of his own policies. By signing and Entente with France, he plunged Britain directly into continental affairs.
The First Moroccan Crisis, 1905
The German was seen by Lansdowne as an attempt to shatter the Entente. It actually made it stronger. The events of 1905 hastened a transformation in military strategy. The foreign secretary was forced to consider what would happen if a deterioration in relations with Germany occured.
The Advent of Sir Edward Grey
Grey took office in a moment of crisis. He was a conservative by tradition and inclinatino, yet he remained suprisingly radical in some of his domestic sympathies. "E.G. is like steel. His display of character is immense...it shines out." Grey was a big navy many and favored the Fisher reforms.
"It was essential that the Liberals...be represented by a man whose patriotism was not in doubt and who wuold gain support from both sides of the House." Does anyone exist like that anymore?
He was thought of as a statesmen rather than a politician. Against an alliance with Germany from the beginning, Grey favored alliances with the US, Russia, and France.
Monday, November 1, 2010
Joll/Martel 254-298: The Mood of 1914
Joll/Martel describes the mood before the war very well. He begins by stating the obvious fact that we cannot possibly know the mood because "we lack the detailed study of opinion in most countries."
There were many movements against war. They started with middle class organizations in favor of international arbitration. The support for such peace movements came from many things, one of which was the growing fear that "war was now becoming so costly and so deadly that it would in fact become impossible."
Two international peace conferences were held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, but neither were taken very seriously. The first was a result of a proposal by Nic II. People mainly agreed as to not offend the tsar.
"We German pacifists have always recognized the right and obligation of national self-defense" (262).
The international socialist movement appeared confident that it could prevent war. The movement thought that the strength of the organized socialist parties would be sufficient to deter governments from making war. The socialists feared that money that funded the army would also fund movements against the workers themselves.
Kaiser Willy: "In the present social confusion it may come about that I order you to shoot down your own relatives, brothers or parents but even then you must follow my orders without a murmur" (265).
However much any socialists repeated their intention to carry out a general strike against war, they had made no actual preparations to do so. The German SDP was more realistic; they rejected the idea of a general strike against war. They were also committed to the idea of national self-defense.
The British "avereage men and women were delighted at the prospect of war" (272). Joll/Martel states that the mood before the war must be seem as the "product of a widespread revolt against the liberal values of peace and rational solutions of all problems that had been taken for granted by many people for much of the 19th century" (274).
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century a new type of strident nationalism had found its way into the writings of many Euroeans. This new nationalism was thought of as being a matter of instinct rather than of reason. There was a widespread belief that was was not only inevitable, but desireable. In every country children were taught to be proud of their characteristic national values. Programs like the Boy Scouts (and their equivalents in France, Russia, and Germany) assisted the state in these endevours.
When the decision for war came, governments were able to fight the war because their subjects accepted the necessity for it.
There were many movements against war. They started with middle class organizations in favor of international arbitration. The support for such peace movements came from many things, one of which was the growing fear that "war was now becoming so costly and so deadly that it would in fact become impossible."
Two international peace conferences were held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907, but neither were taken very seriously. The first was a result of a proposal by Nic II. People mainly agreed as to not offend the tsar.
"We German pacifists have always recognized the right and obligation of national self-defense" (262).
The international socialist movement appeared confident that it could prevent war. The movement thought that the strength of the organized socialist parties would be sufficient to deter governments from making war. The socialists feared that money that funded the army would also fund movements against the workers themselves.
Kaiser Willy: "In the present social confusion it may come about that I order you to shoot down your own relatives, brothers or parents but even then you must follow my orders without a murmur" (265).
However much any socialists repeated their intention to carry out a general strike against war, they had made no actual preparations to do so. The German SDP was more realistic; they rejected the idea of a general strike against war. They were also committed to the idea of national self-defense.
The British "avereage men and women were delighted at the prospect of war" (272). Joll/Martel states that the mood before the war must be seem as the "product of a widespread revolt against the liberal values of peace and rational solutions of all problems that had been taken for granted by many people for much of the 19th century" (274).
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century a new type of strident nationalism had found its way into the writings of many Euroeans. This new nationalism was thought of as being a matter of instinct rather than of reason. There was a widespread belief that was was not only inevitable, but desireable. In every country children were taught to be proud of their characteristic national values. Programs like the Boy Scouts (and their equivalents in France, Russia, and Germany) assisted the state in these endevours.
When the decision for war came, governments were able to fight the war because their subjects accepted the necessity for it.
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